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GOD

AND

GOVERNMENT

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY VS. GREGORY WALLACE*
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: The Religion Clause of the
First Amendment offers a simple but wise teaching: private
religion is a good thing and it should be protected, but
government-sponsored religion is a bad thing. Thomas
Jefferson was exactly right when he said that there should
be a wall that separates church and state. I’ve always
understood that to mean that the place for religion is in the
private realm—in people’s homes, churches, synagogues,
mosques, hearts, and minds—but that our government
should be secular.
Why should our government be completely secular?
There are several reasons. One is that we want to make sure
that every citizen feels equally that it is his or her own
government. Justice O’Connor captured this well in her
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffre, when she said that the central
teaching of the Establishment Clause is that none of us
should be made to feel outsiders under our own government,
nor should others be made to feel that they’re insiders relative
to the government. Imagine that you, as a non-Christian
lawyer, walked into a courtroom with a large Latin cross
behind the judge’s bench. Would you feel that this was
your courtroom or your government? The answer is clearly
no. If City Hall had a large cross on top, those who aren’t
Christian would clearly feel like outsiders. One reason why
we want to make sure that our government is secular is so
that each of us, from every faith or no faith, can equally
believe that it is our government.
Another reason why we want the government to be
strictly secular is it is wrong to spend a person’s money to
support a religion that he or she doesn’t believe in. Over 200
years ago, James Madison said it’s immoral to spend one
person’s money to support the religion of another. By making
sure that our government is secular, we ensure that our
dollars aren’t advancing a faith that we don’t believe in or
even find repugnant.
Another reason why we want our government to be
strictly secular is because religion is divisive. If the history
of the world teaches anything about religion, it’s how intense
people’s religious feelings are, how much society can be
divided over religion. If the government becomes aligned
with religion, there’s going to be a fight about which religion.
Even if the Christian majority decides it’s going to be a
Christian religion, then you have the question of what
denomination of Christianity is going to be in control. By
saying our government is secular, we avoid that.
Finally, we keep our government secular to protect
religion itself. Robert Williams, who was one of the founders
of the Constitution, expressed this long ago when he said
that the reason we want a separation of church and state is
to protect the church, because once the government starts
giving money to religion, the government can regulate what
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religion does. We protect the free exercise of religion by
ensuring that our government is secular.
Now, that was abstract. Here are a few concrete
examples of what secular government means. First,
government-sponsored religious activity in public schools
is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has been exactly
right on this for over forty years. It has said that prayer,
even voluntary prayer, is unconstitutional because it is
government-sponsored religious activity. The Supreme Court
has said that clergy-delivered prayers at public school
graduations are unconstitutional because students feel
pressure to be at their graduation and prayer should not be
part of that if they don’t believe in it. Five years ago the
Supreme Court said that student-delivered prayers at high
school football games are unconstitutional. The Court
explained that students often have to be at football games,
as part of the band, for getting credit, for being cheerleaders,
and the like, and to have a prayer, even a student prayer,
violates this principle. The Supreme Court has even said
that a moment of prayer is unconstitutional. In reality
students have been saying silent prayers as long as teachers
have been giving tests. The government doesn’t need to
institutionalize silent prayer; if it does, it is a governmentsponsored religious activity.
Perhaps even more controversial, I think the words
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools
are unconstitutional. The words “under God” are inherently
religious; they cannot be secular. Yet those who believe in
no religion or a non-theistic God will feel enormous pressure
to participate in pledging allegiance to a god. When my
youngest grandchild, now seven, was in kindergarten in the
public school in Los Angeles, she came home at the
beginning of the second week of school and showed mom
and me how to do the Pledge of Allegiance. She put her
hand on her heart and recited it. My wife said, “I thought
you won a Ninth Circuit decision that the words ‘under God’
in the Pledge of Allegiance were unconstitutional.” I said,
“Well, the Ninth Circuit stayed that order.” My
granddaughter said, “No, you have to say that or you get
sent to the principal’s office.” That’s not what the teacher
said, but what she internalized in the five days of school is,
you do what the teacher says or you go to the principal’s
office as punishment. That’s what children all over the
country feel today, because of the words “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance in the public schools.
The second example is that religious symbols should
not be on government property, if they symbolically endorse
religion. This has been a principle that the Supreme Court
has followed for almost two decades. Thus, the Supreme
Court has said that there can be a nativity scene on
government property if it’s surrounded by symbols of other
religions and secular symbols. A nativity scene all by itself
is impermissible, however. Last June, the Supreme Court
said that a Ten Commandments display at a Kentucky county
courthouse was unconstitutional because the government
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acted with the purpose of advancing religion. The Court
was wrong in another Ten Commandments case decided the
same day, and I confess to self-interest that I argued that
case in the Supreme Court and lost five-to-four. It was about
the six-feet-high, three-feet-wide Ten Commandments
monument on the Texas state capitol grounds, at the Texas
Supreme Court. It sat all by itself at that corner and had in
huge letters, “I am the Lord thy God.” Given its placement
and context, it is clearly government’s symbolic endorsement
of religion. What about somebody who doesn’t believe in
religion or is atheistic? Would they still feel that it’s their
government as they walk into the state capitol? Won’t they
inevitably feel like outsiders? Aren’t their tax dollars every
year paying to take care of that monument?
One final example: the government should not give
assistance that can be used for religious instruction in
parochial schools. Until very recently, the Supreme Court
was exactly right in this area. The government should be
able to give aid to parochial schools if it’s the same that it’s
giving the public schools and if it can’t be used in religious
instruction. The Supreme Court has modified this recently
to say that the government can’t give aid to parochial schools
that goes into religious indoctrination, because my tax dollars
and your tax dollars shouldn’t be supporting religions that
we don’t believe.
This isn’t about hostility to religion. I believe in a
robust Free Exercise Clause, but religion should be in the
private realm and not in the government’s realm. Sandra Day
O’Connor wrote in a decision about the Ten Commandments
on June 27th, “By enforcing the [Religion] Clauses, we have
kept religion a matter for the individual conscience, not for
the prosecutor or the bureaucrat. At a time when we see
around the world the violent consequences of the
assumption of religious authority by government, Americans
may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for
constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar
travails, while allowing private religious exercise to flourish.
. . . Those who would re-negotiate the boundaries between
church and state must therefore answer a difficult question:
Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for
one that has served others so poorly?”
Professor Wallace.
PROFESSOR WALLACE: Thank you, Professor
Chemerinsky. I agree with much of what you said. The
reasons that you gave for government being strictly secular
are also, in many respects, good reasons for government
avoiding an establishment of religion, which is what, in fact,
the Religion Clause prohibits. There is nothing in the text of
the Religion Clause that says government must be “strictly
secular.” I hope that Professor Chemerinsky might further
define for us what he means by “strictly secular” when he
responds in a moment.
There’s nothing in the Religion Clause that says
government cannot make any references to God or
government cannot act as if God exists. In fact, in formulating
the Religion Clause, broader language actually was proposed
and rejected by Congress. Samuel Livermore proposed that
the Religion Clause read, “Congress shall make no law
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touching religion.” That broad interpretation of how
government should relate to religion was rejected by
Congress.
The Religion Clause does prohibit an “establishment
of religion.” Now, that is a term that we are not terribly familiar
with, since we haven’t seen religious establishments in their
formal sense in this country for more than a hundred years.
Because of that, we need to consult history and tradition to
help us understand what the Religion Clause means. The
hallmark of religious establishments was state-enforced
religious uniformity. The government would use its coercive
power to pressure people to conform to the religion of the
majority. Now, we don’t want government pressuring people
to hold certain religious beliefs or to perform certain religious
acts. We might describe this as a no-imposition principle.
We don’t want government interfering with or directing
people’s individual religious choices.
The question that we’re concerned with today is, Can
government speak about God in a way that doesn’t pressure
people to change their religious beliefs or actions? I think it
can. The position that Professor Chemerinsky has taken is
that of strict neutrality. I’m curious as to how far, exactly,
that goes. Does it require complete government agnosticism
toward religion? If it does, I think there are some problems
with that position.
First, official agnosticism is inconsistent with the
history and tradition of our country. There are references to
God in the Declaration of Independence and other public
documents. We have a long history reaching back to the
founding period of governmental religious proclamations.
There is a reference to God in our national motto. We can
see that on the money that we carry around. We see
references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, on public
buildings, on monuments, in speeches of our leaders. For
example, there are fourteen references to God in the 699
words of Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address,
which is inscribed on the walls of the Lincoln Memorial.
Court sessions are opened with an acknowledgment of God:
“God save the United States and this honorable Court.” To
take the position that the Religion Clause requires
government agnosticism conflicts with our long history and
tradition.
A second problem with requiring government
agnosticism is this: If government cannot show cognizance
of God, then it cannot recognize limits on its own power.
This is one of the central ideas of the Declaration of
Independence: People have certain inalienable rights
endowed by their Creator, and when government acts in
conflict with those rights, when government acts in a way
that violates those rights and oppresses people, people have
the right to overthrow the government. By recognizing God,
government can assert the limits of its own power and
prerogative, and it can affirm a transcendent source of human
rights and dignity. Thomas Jefferson worried about how the
liberties of our nation would be secure if removed from what
he called their only firm basis: a conviction in the minds of
people that these liberties are a gift of God.
Finally, the predominant justifications for our
constitutional commitment to religious freedom presuppose
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God’s existence. The whole idea of religious freedom is based
on taking seriously the central claim of religion, namely, that
God exists. Religious freedom makes sense only if God’s
being makes sense: God makes claims on humans; those
claims are prior to and superior to the claims of the state; the
individual’s response to God’s claims, if it is to be authentic,
must not be coerced; the state, therefore, must not attempt
to define or direct the relationship between God and
individual. On the other hand, if God doesn’t exist, then
religion is nothing more than silly superstition –– on the
same level as fortune-telling or believing in ghosts –– and it
makes no sense to constitutionalize its protection. Look at
Jefferson’s bill for establishing religious freedom, which was
introduced in the state of Virginia. The entire preamble
amounts to a religious argument for religious freedom.
Requiring government agnosticism would eliminate the very
justifications for Jefferson’s bill. It would be ironic to interpret
our constitutional protection for religious freedom to require
government agnosticism about God’s existence. The Religion
Clause would be in conflict with itself.
I think a better approach is not strict secularism but
what I call a no-imposition principle. First, government
should not favor any one particular religion over the other.
This, of course, would forbid the display of a cross behind
the judge or in a state house. Second, government should
not engage in a religious imperative. By this I mean that
government should not tell people what to believe and
practice in matters of religion. This is the hallmark of an
establishment of religion, and it’s what the Religion Clause
prohibits. Government must not speak in a way that is likely
to pressure people to make religious choices or to engage in
religious acts. For government to interject itself into
individual decision-making in religious matters is to violate
religious conscience.
There are times when government can speak
religiously and not interfere with individual religious
decisions. I agree with Professor Chemerinsky that the school
prayer cases were decided correctly because, in that context,
pressure was brought to bear on children to engage in a
religious activity –– prayer –– in violation of their religious
conscience. Simply exposing persons to religious messages,
such as by referring to God in the Declaration of
Independence or national motto or by hanging a religious
painting in a government-sponsored museum, without more,
does not seem to me to be the kind of infringement on
religious conscience that the Framers contemplated.
In a pluralistic society where the government is a
significant participant in the formation of public culture, the
best understanding of what the Religion Clause forbids and
permits is one that allows government speech to reflect the
mixture of religious and nonreligious perspectives in the
private sector. In that way, government influence on religious
choices is minimized because the public would be presented
with the same variety of perspectives if government were
absent from public cultural sphere.
Professor Chemerinsky.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: If all you’re saying is, It’s
okay to have “In God We Trust” on money or “God save
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this honorable Court” at the beginning of the Supreme Court
sessions, I don’t think we disagree, although I could argue
that is pretty trivial. If what you’re saying is that the
government can express a profoundly religious message,
that the government can indoctrinate people by
communicating religious views in government speech, then
we disagree.
I began by saying we need to have our government
be secular, and I gave several reasons for that: to ensure
we’re all treated as equal citizens and equally in the
government, it’s wrong to give some of our money to support
the religion of others, it’s inherently divisive if the
government becomes aligned with religion, and it threatens
religion itself. I assume we agree on that.
Professor Wallace says several things. First, the
Religion Clause prohibits the establishment of religion. Not
quite right. The First Amendment prohibits the government
from any law “respecting the establishment of religion.”
That’s broader than just prohibiting the establishment of
religion, but what does that mean?
Second, he talks about there being references to God
throughout American history. That depends on context. I’d
rather our money didn’t say “In God We Trust,” because I
think government shouldn’t be expressing religious
messages. If it bothers you that your money says that, I’m
glad to take the problem off your hand. I don’t think it’s a
very big deal, however. Likewise, I’d rather they didn’t say
before Court sessions, “God save this honorable Court”,
but I don’t see it as a very big deal. If you change that a little
bit — and I apologize if you view it as blasphemy — “In the
name of Jesus Christ, God save this honorable Court”, I
would be deeply offended because it’s invoking a particular
religion. Is there a difference for an atheist between saying
“one nation under Jesus Christ” and “one nation under
God”? Both are equally objectionable. The Pledge of
Allegiance is different than “In God We Trust” on coins or
“God save this honorable Court” because in order to spend
money in the store, you don’t have to say “In God We
Trust”; in order to argue at the Supreme Court, you don’t
have to say, “God save this honorable Court”. Children feel
pressure every day to say “one nation under God,” and
that’s objectionable.
The next point you make is that to have limits on
government power, we need to recognize the existence of
religion. I vehemently disagree. Our limits on governmental
power come initially from the Constitution, which formed
the United States government, and secondly from theories
of government like social contract theory and natural law
(or, for you, religion). I don’t accept that the only theory
that provides limits on government is a religious theory.
There are countless jurisprudential theories and
philosophical theories that can also limit government power.
Finally, he said that religious freedom makes sense
only if we acknowledge the existence of God. Again, I
strongly disagree. All we need to protect religious freedom
is to recognize that there are many people in this country
who believe in religion. Even those who don’t believe in
religion can recognize that for those who do, it’s very
important, and the Constitution says we’ll protect free
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exercise of religion. We’ll protect free exercise for those who
do and for those who don’t believe in religion. We don’t
need to believe in God in order to believe that the free exercise
of religion is important.
It’s easier to identify disagreements if we talk about
specifics. First of all, Professor Wallace says he believes in
a no-imposition principle. I also think that the government
shouldn’t impose religion. What does that mean and is it
sufficient, or is it just part of what the Religious Clause
meant? I have three specific examples. First, there shouldn’t
be government-sponsored religious activity in public school
classrooms. No prayers, no voluntary prayer, no silent
prayer, and not even “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance
because students feel pressure to say it. That’s clearly
consistent with the no-imposition rule. Second, there
shouldn’t be religious symbols on government property in
a manner that appears to endorse religion. When you said
there shouldn’t be a large Latin cross behind the judge’s
bench or on top of the seal, I think you agree with that. I see
no difference between the large Ten Commandments
monument and a large cross.
The Ten Commandments monument on the Texas state
capitol grounds, in the Texas Supreme Court, displays the
Protestant version of the Ten Commandments. The Jewish
version of the Ten Commandments is different; it has different
language in a number of places. The First Commandment, in
the Jewish version, says “I am the Lord thy God who took
you out of Egypt, out of bondage.” That’s not the version at
the Texas state capitol. The Catholic version of the Ten
Commandments is also traditionally different. It does not
prohibit images of God because of the importance of saints
and statuaries within the Catholic faith. That’s not the Texas
version. If you accept no-imposition, the Supreme Court
was wrong. Putting the Protestant version of the Ten
Commandments at the Texas state capitol is the imposition
of a religion.
Finally, with regard to aid to parochial schools, I said
the government should not provide any assistance to
parochial schools that will be used for religious
indoctrination or religious education, because that would
be the government supporting imposition of faith. If we agree
on those three specifics, then we really agree on the principle.
Maybe there’s some abstract agreement, but my guess is
that there is a fundamental disagreement between us. Our
government should be, to the greatest extent possible, a
secular government. The place for religion should be a
robust free exercise clause. As Justice O’Connor said, this
is the system that has served us well for 200 years. Why
replace it with a system that has served others throughout
the world, throughout history, so poorly?
PROFESSOR WALLACE: I am pleased to see Professor
Chemerinsky concede that there is some place for government
to acknowledge God in its speech, but he says, Not in the
occasional setting, not in government symbols, and not in
government funding. I’m not sure exactly what sphere of
government activity that leaves. The strictly secular
approach urged by Professor Chemerinsky might make more
sense if two things were true: first, that we had a minimalist
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government; and second, that we had no long history of
religious speech by government.
Let me address the first. Given our modern regulatory
state with its ever-growing influence over personal behavior,
over education, over public culture, strictly secular
government speech would not be neutral toward religion.
Secular speech, because it encompasses only that which is
this-worldly, can convey the idea that all knowledge and
value is confined to the secular or temporal world and that
this reality is the only reality that really counts. As one
writer has said, it’s a fallacy to suppose that by omitting a
subject, you teach nothing about it; on the contrary, you
teach that it is to be omitted, and that it therefore is a matter
of secondary importance. For the state to convey only secular
or non-religious viewpoints would make those viewpoints
and ideals familiar, easily understood, acceptable. On the
other hand, total silence about God would marginalize or
trivialize religious views by making them seem irrelevant or
outdated or even strange.
So, for the state to confine itself to non-religious
speech in all the ways that it affects public culture would
not in any sense be “neutral.” And as I suggested earlier,
when government is a significant participant in the formation
of public culture, the best understanding of neutrality is
one that allows government speech to reflect the same
mixture of religious and nonreligious perspectives in the
private sector. In this way, government is not able to leverage
its power on individual religious choice. People would be
exposed to the same diverse voices as if government were
not in the public sector at all.
The second problem for Professor Chemerinsky is our
long history of government religious speech. Given that
long history, the elimination of all religious language and
symbols from the government sphere, as Professor
Chemerinsky proposes, would send a forceful message of
hostility toward religion. If you’re going to take his position
seriously, it would mean removing the inscriptions containing
religious language from the walls of the Lincoln and
Jefferson memorials, changing names of streets, cities,
mountain ranges, expunging from public school textbooks
the religious affirmations in the Declaration of Independence
and other public documents, etc.
Professor Chemerinsky would allow for some
government religious speech for government that doesn’t
endorse religion. I don’t find the endorsement test particularly
helpful here because any time government speaks or acts as
if God exists, even in the statement “In God We Trust,” it is
a religious affirmation. That affirmation is an endorsement
of a claim that is central to religion: God exists. I don’t see
how a consistent application of the endorsement test would
not lead to the kind of completely secular sphere that
Professor Chemerinsky advocates.
Thank you.
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